Abstract Driven by an appreciation of the field’s early stage of development, I apply the concept of exploratory experimentation, originally put forward in the late 90s philosophy of biology, to current research in cognitive neuroscience. I concentrate on functional magnetic resonance imaging and how this wide-spread technique is used, from experimental design to data analysis. I claim that, although subject to certain significant modifications with respect to the concept’s original rendering, the exploratory character of neuroimaging experiments can be appreciated considering their goals, centered on the stabilization of experimental systems for phenomenological description, and the relevance of their methodological facet. Although I do not claim that there is a specific kind of experiment that one can single out as definitely exploratory, exploration can be seen as a general trait imbuing fMRI-based experimentation.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging is one of the most commonly used neuroimaging techniques in cognitive neuroscience. Its influence had a central role in establishing the experimental side of the field. Given this, we consider that its status as a source of evidence has not been sufficiently dealt within the philosophical literature. We focus on this issue from the standpoint of the classical problem of defining the scope of localizationist approaches in neuroscience. We attend to the way this tension unfolds today, considering some recent examples of neuroscientific approaches that tackle the dynamic character of the brain's large scale activity. We take into account a number of limitations that functional magnetic resonance imaging presents, distinguishing those of them whose treatment involves not merely technical issues. On the basis of an analysis of some ways researchers deal with them, we claim that there is a considerable extent in which this kind of neuroimaging studies can be oriented according to general assumptions and theoretical considerations. We conclude that this particular theoretical permeability is a main factor affecting the technique's status as neuroscientific evidence.

La resonancia magnética funcional es una de las técnicas de neuroimagen más difundidas en las neurociencias cognitivas. Su influencia tuvo un rol central en la configuración del aspecto experimental de este campo. Frente a esto, consideramos que su estatus como evidencia no ha sido suficientemente discutido en la literatura filosófica. En este trabajo nos centramos sobre este punto abordando el problema clásico de definir el alcance que puede tener la estrategia localizacionista en neurociencias. Atendemos al modo en que este problema se manifiesta hoy, tomando algunos ejemplos recientes de abordajes neurocientíficos caracterizados por estudiar el carácter dinámico de la actividad a gran escala en el cerebro. Tomamos en cuenta un número de limitaciones que presenta la resonancia magnética funcional, distinguiendo aquellas cuyo tratamiento pone en juego problemáticas de una índole no meramente técnica. A partir del análisis de algunas maneras en que los investigadores les hacen frente, sostenemos que existe una medida importante en que este tipo de estudios de neuroimagen pueden ser orientados sobre la base de supuestos y consideraciones teóricas generales. Concluimos que esta particular permeabilidad teórica de la resonancia magnética funcional es un factor central que incide sobre su estatus como evidencia neurocientífica.

W. R. Ashby is known as a central figure of the mid-twentieth century cybernetics movement. Here his historical significance concerning the following development of the cognitive and behavioral sciences is assessed. Specifically, the paper focuses on the epistemological and methodological assumptions and implications behind the homeostat, a famous cybernetic device presented by Ashby during the 1952 Macy conference in order to study adaptive behavior. On the one hand, the contact points between the behavioral tradition in psychology and the theoretical and programmatic statement underlying the homeostat are considered: Over and above Ashby's strong behaviorist roots, it will be shown how the homeostat also clearly departs from behaviorism. On the other hand, the guidelines of a solid philosophy of scientific modeling stemming from Ashby's early contribution are highlighted.

W. R. Ashby es reconocido como una figura fundamental de la cibernética de mediados del siglo veinte. Aquí se evalúa su relevancia histórica para el desarrollo posterior de las ciencias cognitivas y del comportamiento. En particular, se analizan los supuestos y las implicaciones epistemológicas y metodológicas del homeostato, un conocido dispositivo cibernético presentado por Ashby durante la conferencia Macy de 1952 para el estudio del comportamiento adaptativo. Por un lado, se evalúan los puntos de contacto entre la tradición conductista en psicología y el planteo teórico y programático subyacente al homeostato: más allá de la fuerte raigambre conductista de Ashby, se evidencia en qué sentido el homeostato marca también un claro distanciamiento de aquella tradición. Por otro lado, se subrayan los lineamientos de una sólida epistemología de los modelos científicos en esta temprana contribución de Ashby.